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replacement properties that could be identified, the Tax
Court in a footnote stated clearly that the decision should
not be interpreted as inferring that the regulation “is not a
valid exercise of the Commissioner’s authority to interpret a
statute which is silent on the matter.”26
FOOTNOTES
1 See generally 4 Harl Agricultural Law § 27.03[8][a]
(1996); Harl, Agricultural Law Manual § 4.02[16]
(1996).
2 4 Harl, supra n. 1, § 29.04[1][b].
3 I.R.C. § 1031(a)(3).
4 St. Laurent v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1996-150.
5 I.R.C. § 1031.
6 Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-369, Sec.
77(a), 98 Stat. 494, 595.
7 602 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979).
8 I.R.C. § 1031(a)(3).
9 I.R.C. § 1031(a)(3)(A).
10 I.R.C. § 1031(a)(3)(B).
11 Fair market value is determined without regard to the
liabilities secured by the property. T.D. 8346, April 25,
1991.
12 Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(k)-1(c)(4)(i), added by T.D. 8346,
April 25, 1991, 1991-1 C.B. 150. The regulations were
issued on May 16, 1990.
13 Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(k)-1(o). In certain instances, the
regulations applied to transfers on or after May 16, 1990.
14 St. Laurent v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1996-150.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 I.R.C. § 1031(a)(3).
18 H. Conf. Rep. 98-861 at 866 (1984), 1984-3 C.B. 1, 120
(vol. 2).
19 T.C. Memo. 1996-150.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 St. Laurent v. Comm’r, n. 14 supra.
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ANIMALS
HORSES. The plaintiff was injured when the plaintiff’s
automobile struck two of the defendant’s horses on a public
highway. The plaintiff sued in absolute liability under
Baltimore County Ordinance 6-204 which made animal
owners liable for damages caused by the animals. The
ordinance did not restate state law which provided only for
liability by negligence or strict liability. The defendant
argued that the ordinance could not create a new cause of
action involving an area of statewide concern. The court
agreed, holding that the absolute liability of the ordinance
was a new cause of action because it imposed liability
without a showing of negligence or that the defendant knew
that the horses had a propensity to escape, which was
required for imposition of strict liability. Gunpowder
Stables v. State Farm, 673 A.2d 721 (Md. Ct. App. 1996).
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
AUTOMATIC STAY. Prior to filing for bankruptcy,
the Chapter 11 farmer debtor signed an agreement with a
secured creditor not to file a voluntary bankruptcy petition
and not to oppose any motion for relief from the automatic
stay filed by the creditor if the debtor did file for
bankruptcy. The court held the contractual waiver of the
automatic stay unenforceable because (1) the debtor lacked
the capacity to waive the rights of the debtor in possession,
(2) the waiver was unenforceable under several provisions
of the Bankruptcy Code, and (3) the Bankruptcy Code
invalidates contractual provisions which waive the debtor’s
bankruptcy rights. Matter of Pease, 195 B.R. 431 (Bankr.
D. Neb. 1996).
    CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
PLAN MODIFICATION. The debtors had completed
their Chapter 12 plan payments and received their
discharge. The plan had provided for payment of a secured
claim over 30 years. The claim was secured by a lien
against farm real and personal property. Three years after
the discharge, the debtors sought to modify the plan by
selling the collateral real estate, paying a portion of the
proceeds on the secured claim and providing a substitute
lien on other real estate. The rest of the proceeds would be
used to pay off other debts and for operating expenses. The
court held that the plan could not be modified because the
original five years of the plan had passed and because the
debtors had no change in circumstances which supported a
needed modification of the plan. The court noted that the
debtors could satisfy the debt from the proceeds of the sale
of the land and use the other real estate as collateral for
other loans for operating expenses. Matter of
Schnakenberg, 195 B.R. 435 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1996).
TRUSTEE FEES. The Chapter 12 debtor’s plan
provided for most of the plan payments to be made directly
to creditors and the plan was confirmed over the objection
of the trustee. The trustee’s appeals of the ruling were
fruitless and the trustee sought, under the equitable powers
of the court, compensation for the substantial expenses
incurred in administering the case. The trustee argued that
the court had the authority, under Section 105, to provide
for adequate compensation of the trustee where the plan did
not provide for payments through the trustee’s office. The
court held that Section 105 could be used only to enforce or
    Agricultural Law Digest                                                                                                                                                                                               103
further other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and the
Code did not provide for or otherwise require adequate
compensation of the trustee in all cases. Matter of Cross,
195 B.R. 440 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1996). See also Matter of
Cross, 182 B.R. 42 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1995).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES. The debtor
originally filed for Chapter 11 but converted the case to
Chapter 7 after two years.  The IRS filed a claim in the
Chapter 7 case for post-petition, preconversion taxes plus
interest and penalties.  The parties agreed that the taxes and
interest were entitled to administrative expense priority but
disagreed as to the penalties. The Bankruptcy Court held
that under Section 503(b), the penalties were entitled to the
same priority as the taxes to which the penalties applied.
However, the Bankruptcy Court applied Section 510(c)(1)
and subordinated the penalties to all other priority claims,
thus causing the penalties to be paid pro rata with other
second priority claims. The IRS had also filed a claim after
the claims bar date in the Chapter 7 case for additional taxes
for the same period. The Bankruptcy Court allowed the
additional claim as an amendment to the original timely
filed claim because the amendment related to the same type
of tax and the same taxable period. The Bankruptcy Court
also subordinated the penalties associated with the
additional taxes. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the IRS claims could not be subordinated where the
priority was specifically determined by statute. In re First
Truck Lines, Inc., 116 S.Ct. 1524 (1996), rev’g, 48 F.3d
210 (6th Cir. 1995), aff'g unrep. D. Ct. dec. aff'g, 141
B.R. 621 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1992).
AVOIDABLE LIENS. The IRS had filed prepetition
tax liens against the debtor’s property. The debtor and
trustee sought to avoid the liens, under Section 545(2) and
I.R.C. § 6323(b) as to an automobile and household goods
with individual values of $250 or less. The trustee argued
that the trustee’s status as a bona fide purchaser of the estate
property was sufficient to give the trustee priority over the
property under I.R.C. § 6323(b). The court held that I.R.C.
§ 6323(b) also required that the trustee have taken
possession of the property and obtained the property by
purchase without actual knowledge of the tax lien.  Because
the trustee did not obtain the property by purchase and had
knowledge of the lien, the tax lien was not avoidable by the
trustee. I.R.S. v. Diperna, 195 B.R. 358 (E.D. N.C. 1996).
CLAIM. The debtors filed for Chapter 12 and the IRS
filed a claim for taxes based on an investigation of the
debtors’ corporations. The IRS determined that the debtors
had received income through payments made to
corporations which were wholly-owned by the debtors. The
corporations had not filed income tax returns and the
debtors had not claimed much income during the years
involved. The debtors attempted to rebut the IRS claim by
presenting testimony of the income tax preparer who
testified that any income tax returns filed were based on
information given by the debtors and was not based on any
independent evidence. The court held that the debtors failed
to provide sufficient evidence of the separateness of the
corporations or that the debtors did not have income during
the years involved. The court noted that the IRS claim had a
prima facie presumption of correctness, and the debtors had
the opportunity to rebut the claim but merely failed to
provide sufficient independent evidence for rebuttal. In re
Brown, 82 F.3d 801 (8th Cir. 1996).
DISCHARGE. The debtors timely filed their income
tax returns for several tax years more than three years
before the filing of the petition. In 1986 and 1988, the
debtors filed a Chapter 7 and a 13 case which were
dismissed. The IRS assessed the debtors for additional taxes
for these tax years more than 240 days before the current
case was filed in 1990, and more than three years after the
tax returns were filed. The IRS argued that, under Section
108(c) and I.R.C. § 6503(h), the first two bankruptcy cases
tolled the three year period of Sections 507(a)(7)(A)(i) and
523(a)(7)(B) such that the taxes were not dischargeable
under those sections. The court held that the plain language
of Section 108(c) and I.R.C. § 6503(h) indicates that those
laws do not apply to bankruptcy provisions. The court also
denied relief to the IRS on equitable grounds, noting that
the IRS had several years to collect the taxes while the
debtor was not in bankruptcy. The court noted a significant
split in the cases on this issue. In re Turner,  195 B.R. 476
(Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1996), aff’g on reconsideration, 182
B.R. 317 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1995).
PLAN. The debtor’s Chapter 13 plan provided for full
payment of a secured federal tax claim over the length of
the plan at 7 percent interest. The IRS argued that the rate of
interest should be the interest rate of I.R.C. § 6621(a)(2) for
underpayments at the time of the petition. The debtor
argued that the IRS was entitled only to a market rate of
interest. The court held that the Section 6621(a)(2) interest
rate, at the effective date of the plan, would be a
presumptive market rate of interest subject to the debtor’s
proof of a more accurate market interest rate. Because the
debtor failed to demonstrate the market interest rate, the
court held that the Section 6621(a)(2) rate on the effective
date of the plan was to be used. In re Cheek, 195 B.R. 151
(Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1996).
This case involved two Chapter 11 plans. The first plan
provided for payment of a secured federal tax claim over six
years at 8 percent and an unsecured priority claim over five
years at 8 percent. The second plan provided for payment of
the secured tax claim over ten years and the unsecured
claim over five years, both at 8 percent. The IRS argued that
the tax claims were entitled to absolute priority, but the
court held that, under Section 1129, secured claims were not
entitled to absolute priority. The IRS also argued that it was
entitled to compound interest on its claims, but the court
held that compound interest was not required for plan
payments to meet the “indisputable equivalent
requirement.” The court also held that the second plan’s
payment term of ten years for the secured claim was too
long in that the collateral’s value would not protect the
claim over that many years. United States v. Creamer, 195
B.R. 154 (M.D. Fla. 1996).
TAX LIENS. The debtor received payment for a
workers’ compensation claim and purchased a house with
the proceeds. The IRS then filed notices of tax liens against
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the debtor’s property for taxes owed for several years.
However, one of the notices identified the wrong tax year
involved. The debtor sought to avoid the tax liens against
the house as exempt property and for the failure of one of
the notices to be accurate. The court held that the error
involving the tax year was minor and insufficient to void
the notice. The court also held that the house was exempt
from levy but not from the lien which continued after the
bankruptcy case. Matter of Sills, 82 F.3d 111 (5th Cir.
1996).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
CROP INSURANCE. The FCIC has issued proposed
regulations which provide specific provisions for sugar
beets to the Common Crop Insurance Policy. 61 Fed. Reg.
27315 (May 31, 1996).
The FCIC has issued proposed regulations which
provide specific provisions for Texas citrus fruit to the
Common Crop Insurance Policy. 61 Fed. Reg. 28512 (June
5, 1996).
SOILS. The NRCS has issued a revised list of hydric
soils in the United States. 61 Fed. Reg. 29050 (June 7,
1996).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION. The grantor had
established a trust for the grantor with a remainder to the
decedent and further remainders to charities and the
grantor’s heirs. The grantor died first, with the decedent
dying within six months thereafter and before the grantor’s
estate tax return was filed. The trust did not qualify for the
charitable deduction but was reformable under I.R.C. §
2055(e)(3). The IRS ruled that because the charitable
interest passed before the grantor’s estate tax return was
filed or due, the charitable gift did not need to be reformed
in order to qualify for the charitable deduction. Ltr. Rul.
9623019, March 6, 1996.
CLAIMS AGAINST ESTATE. The taxpayer was the
spouse of the decedent and the two had executed a
prenuptial agreement under which the taxpayer waived any
divorce or dower rights in the decedent’s estate and
received, in return, a life estate in the decedent’s apartment
if the two were married when the decedent died. The couple
were still married when the decedent died and the estate
claimed the life estate as a claim against the estate eligible
for a deduction for estate tax purposes. The court
acknowledged that the Tax Court, several Circuit Courts of
Appeal and the IRS had determined that the waiver of
dower and/or divorce rights was sufficient consideration for
a prenuptial agreement transfer of property; however, the
court held that the life estate was taxable in the estate
because the taxpayer had not given anything of value for the
life estate. The court focused on the lack of any gain of
property for the estate from the waiver and the significant
tax advantage to the estate and gain to the surviving spouse
from the prenuptial agreement. Estate of Herrmann v.
Comm’r, 96-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,232 (2d Cir.
1996).
DISCLAIMERS-ALM § 5.02[6].* The decedent’s will
bequeathed the entire estate to the decedent’s siblings with
any remainder to pass to the children of the siblings. One
sibling disclaimed any interest in the estate, causing the
entire estate to pass to the other sibling. The other
disclaimed a one-half interest in the estate. The disclaimed
portion of the estate passed to the children who disclaimed
any interest in the estate. The ruling is silent as to whom the
disclaimed property passed. The IRS ruled that the
disclaimers were effective. Ltr. Rul. 9625033, March 22,
1996.
EXECUTOR LIABILITY.  The decedent’s will
provided for passing of estate property to a trust for the
decedent’s heirs. The taxpayer was an heir and executor of
the estate. After the estate tax return was filed in 1976, the
IRS claimed a deficiency was due. The parties continued
discussions about the matter but in 1977, the heirs agreed to
distribute the estate among themselves, without paying the
claimed deficiency. Some of the property received by the
taxpayer was subject to liens and the taxpayer intentionally
defaulted on the loans and had a wholly-owned corporation
purchase the property in the foreclosure sales, transactions
which the court found to be fraudulent conveyances. The
court held that the taxpayer was personally liable for the
estate taxes owed because the heir agreement made the
estate insolvent at a time when the taxpayer knew that a tax
claim was being made against the estate.  United States v.
Coppola, 96-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,233 (2d Cir.
1996).
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFERS-ALM §
5.04[6].* The IRS has issued proposed regulations removing
Treas. Reg. § 26.2652-1(a)(4) and examples 9 and 10 from
Treas. Reg. § 26.2652-1(a)(6). 61 Fed. Reg. 29714 (June
12, 1996).
IRA. The decedent’s will bequeathed the residuary
estate to a trust for the surviving spouse with remainders to
the decedent’s children. The residuary estate included three
IRAs owned by the decedent. The surviving spouse
disclaimed an interest in the trust equal to the value of the
IRAs and the children disclaimed any remainder interest in
the disclaimed interest. Thus, an amount equal to the value
of the IRAs passed by intestacy to the surviving spouse and
the executor funded the intestacy bequest with the amounts
in the IRAs. The surviving spouse deposited the funds in an
IRA in the spouse’s name. The IRS ruled that the
disclaimers were effective, the IRA funds were treated as
passing directly to the surviving spouse and the surviving
spouse did not need to include the IRA funds in gross
income. Ltr. Rul. 9623064, March 14, 1996.
JOINT TENANCY PROPERTY. The decedent’s
predeceased spouse had purchased real property and
transferred the property to both of them as tenants by the
entirety in 1958. The spouse died in January 1987 and 50
percent of the value of the property was included in the
spouse’s estate. The decedent sold the property in 1990 and
used the estate tax value for 50 percent of the property
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(under the “fractional share” rule) as the basis for
determining gain from the sale. The decedent’s executor
filed an amended income tax return for the year of the sale
to use as a basis the full estate tax value of the property,
under the “consideration furnished rule, removing all gain
from the sale transaction. The issue was whether ERTA
1981 amendments to I.R.C. § 2040 providing for the
fractional share rule replaced the former “consideration
furnished” rule for pre-1977 joint tenancy transfers. The
court cited Gallenstein v. United States, 975 F.2d 286 (6th
Cir. 1992) to support its holding that the 1981 amendment
did not completely replace the previous rule and the
decedent was entitled to include the entire value of the
property for estate tax purposes as the property’s basis in
the sale.  Anderson v. United States, 96-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 60,235 (D. Md. 1996).
LIFE INSURANCE. The taxpayer was a general
partner in a partnership which owned a life insurance policy
on the life of the taxpayer. The partnership paid all
premiums on the insurance policy. The partnership
agreement provided that upon the death of a partner, the
proceeds of a life insurance policy on that partner were to
be held by the partnership to the extent needed to cover
partnership obligations, with the remainder distributed to
the other partners to the extent necessary to purchase the
deceased partner’s interest in the partnership. The IRS ruled
that the taxpayer did not have any incidents of ownership in
the policy and the taxpayer’s interest in the partnership
included in the gross estate would include the insurance
proceeds to the extent of the taxpayer’s proportionate share
of the partnership. Ltr. Rul. 9623024, March 6, 1996.
The taxpayer was a shareholder in a corporation which
executed a buy-sell agreement with a trust in which the
shareholders were trustees. The trust purchased life
insurance policies on all shareholders and the corporation
paid the premiums under a split-dollar agreement under
which, upon the death of a shareholder, the corporation
would receive an amount equal to the premiums paid, with
the trust receiving the remainder in order to repurchase the
stock of the deceased shareholder. If any proceeds yet
remained, those proceeds were paid to the remaining
shareholders. All trust actions required a majority of the
vote of trustees and no shareholder could act in regards to
the life insurance policy on that shareholder. The IRS ruled
that the proceeds of the life insurance policy on the life of a
shareholder were not included in that shareholder’s gross
estate. The corporation converted to a limited liability
company which was taxable as a partnership. The IRS ruled
that the same holding applied after the conversion.  Ltr.
Rul. 9625013, March 20, 1996; Ltr. Rul. 9625014, March
20, 1996; Ltr. Rul. 9625015, March 20, 1996; Ltr. Rul.
9625016, March 20, 1996; Ltr. Rul. 9625017, March 20,
1996; Ltr. Rul. 9625018, March 20, 1996; Ltr. Rul.
9625019, March 20, 1996; Ltr. Rul. 9625020, March 20,
1996; Ltr. Rul. 9625022, March 20, 1996; Ltr. Rul.
9625023, March 20, 1996.
MARITAL DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[3].* The
decedent left a holographic will which bequeathed the entire
estate to the surviving spouse “to be used to maintain the
family & educate our children.” The IRS ruled that under
Virginia law, the quoted language did not bequeath any
specific interest in the estate to the decedent’s children but
bequeathed a fee simple interest in the property to the
surviving spouse. Therefore, the bequeathed property was
eligible for the marital deduction. Ltr. Rul. 9623002, Feb.
7, 1996.
The taxpayer was a decedent’s estate. The decedent’s
will bequeathed all of the estate to the surviving spouse and
provided for all expenses and debts to be paid from the
residuary estate. The estate paid the executor $62,000 as a
personal representative’s fee. The estate had over $105,000
in income during its administration. The estate argued that
the estate income was part of the residue of the estate and
that the fee could be charged against that income. The court
held that, under Wisconsin law, the estate income was not
part of the estate principal; therefore, the executor’s fee was
chargeable against the estate principal and diminished the
amount available for the marital deduction. Estate of
Sobota v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1996-294.
The decedent’s will bequeathed property to the
decedent’s surviving spouse in trust until the spouse dies or
remarries, with the remainder to pass to named charities.
The IRS denied any marital deduction because the spouse’s
interest was contingent upon the spouse’s not remarrying.
The IRS also denied the charitable deduction because the
trust did not qualify as charitable remainder trust. The estate
argued that the I.R.C. allowed for marital and charitable
deductions so at least one or the other or both deductions
should be allowed. The court held that the unambiguous
language of the statutes prevented any marital deduction for
contingent interests or charitable deductions where the
value of the charitable interest could not be determined
when the estate tax return was filed. Roels v. United States,
96-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,234 (E.D. Wis. 1996).
POWER OF APPOINTMENT. The decedent’s will
bequeathed property to the taxpayer, the decedent’s child, in
trust. The trust gave the taxpayer a “limited power of
appointment” over trust corpus but limited the power to the
decedent’s lineal descendants, which included the taxpayer,
thus making the power a general power of appointment. The
taxpayer claimed that the trust document contained a
scrivener’s error such that the power of appointment was to
be limited to the taxpayer’s lineal descendant’s, which
excluded the taxpayer. The taxpayer proposed to obtain a
state probate court order amending the trust document to
correct the error. The IRS ruled that if the trust obtains the
state probate court order revising the trust document, the
taxpayer will be considered to have only a limited power of
appointment over the trust corpus. Ltr. Rul. 9623043,
March 11, 1996.
TRUSTS. A trust had ten equal share beneficiaries who
had the power to require full or partial distribution of their
shares by written request to the trustees. Two beneficiaries
made such a request and the trustee proposed to make an
equal but non-pro rata distribution of assets. Both the trust
instrument and state law allowed non-pro rata distributions
but the state law required an adjustment for any adverse tax
liabilities resulting from the non-pro rata distribution. The
trustee did make adjustment for the tax differences. The IRS
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ruled that no gain was realized from the distributions and
that the basis and holding periods of the assets were
transferred to the beneficiaries. Ltr. Rul. 9625020, March
20, 1996.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
BAD DEBTS. The taxpayer had loaned money to their
son-in-law or guaranteed loans made by the son-in-law to
support the son-in-law’s jewelry business. The taxpayer
eventually became liable for more than $2.1 million. The
taxpayer claimed the loans became worthless in 1986 when
it became clear that the loans would not be repaid.
However, in 1986 through 1988, the taxpayers received
over $400,000 in payments from the son-in-law and the
son-in-law’s bankruptcy case. The payments from the son-
in-law, however, came from funds embezzled from the son-
in-law’s deceased spouse’s estate and from failure to pay
federal taxes. The court held that the taxpayers could not
claim a worthless debt deduction for any of the debt
because the debt was never worthless, since the taxpayers
did receive partial repayment. The court also held that the
source of the payments was irrelevant to the deductibility of
the debt. Buchanan v. United States, 96-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 50,334 (7th Cir. 1996).
CASUALTY LOSSES. This ruling examined two
scenarios: (1) a taxpayer’s dwelling was destroyed by a
tornado and the taxpayer later sold the land and used the
proceeds plus insurance proceeds to buy another existing
home; (2) a taxpayer’s residence was destroyed by an
earthquake and the taxpayer was unable to rebuild until 22
months later because of the widespread destruction. Both
casualties were declared disasters by the president and both
properties were subject to qualified personal residence
indebtedness. In the first circumstance, the IRS ruled that
the sale of the land would be included in the involuntary
conversion of the residence allowing deferral of gain if the
cost of the new residence exceeded the proceeds from the
land sale and insurance. In the second case, the IRS ruled
that interest paid on the qualified personal residence
indebtedness continued to be deductible during the
rebuilding period because the home was rebuilt within a
reasonable period under the circumstances. Rev. Rul. 96-
32, 1996-25, 5.
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS. The
taxpayer was a corporation with one shareholder. The
corporation sued several other parties for breach of contract,
malicious prosecution, intentional interference with a
business relationship, fraud, and violation of fiduciary and
statutory duties. The parties agreed to a settlement which
did not specify any allocation of the settlement to the
various causes of action. The IRS denied any exclusion of
the settlement from the taxpayer’s gross income, except for
the legal expenses incurred. The court agreed, holding that
I.R.C. § 104 allowed exclusion of the settlement only for
compensation for personal injury and a corporation could
not suffer a personal injury. The court rejected the
taxpayer’s argument that the settlement included payment
for personal injuries because the corporation only had one
shareholder and the shareholder was actually the one who
suffered from the other parties’ actions. P & X Markets,
Inc. v. Comm’r, 106 T.C. No 26 (1996).
DEMOLITION. I.R.C. § 280B requires any costs or
losses incurred on account of the demolition of any
structure to be capitalized into the land upon which the
demolished structure was located. The IRS has issued
proposed regulations defining what ``structure'' means for
purposes of Section 280B. The proposed regulations define
the term ``structure'' for purposes of Section 280B as a
building and its structural components as those terms are
defined in Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(e). Thus, under section
280B, a structure will include only a building and its
structural components and not other inherently permanent
structures such as oil and gas storage tanks, blast furnaces,
and coke ovens. 61 Fed. Reg. 31473 (June 20, 1996).
HOBBY LOSSES. After the taxpayer began receiving
substantial royalties from oil and gas on their land, the
taxpayer started a cow-calf operation on the same land. The
taxpayer had substantial losses from the farm operation for
16 years, primarily from depreciation. The court used the
nine factors from Westbrook v. Comm’r, 68 F.3d 868 (5th
Cir. 1995), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 1993-634 to determine that
the cow-calf operation was not entered into for profit,
resulting in disallowance of farm deductions in excess of
farm income. The factors supporting the holding were (1)
failure to keep full and accurate records, (2) the lack of
appreciation of the farm assets, (3) the taxpayer’s lack of
any other successful farming operations, (4) the extensive
and continuous losses from the farm operation, and (5) the
taxpayer’s personal pleasure from the farm. Vallette v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1996-285.
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM § 7.03.*
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUSTMENTS. The IRS began
an administrative adjustment audit of a general partnership
and needed more time to complete the audit. The IRS sent a
Form 870-0 to the partnership to obtain consent for an
extension of time. A tax matters partner had not been
selected by the partnership so a general partner signed the
form. The general partner did not have the largest general
partnership interest in the partnership and was not selected
by the partners as TMP. The court held that the partnership
was estopped from claiming that the extension was
improperly filed and that the general partner was not
authorized to act as TMP because (1) the IRS reasonably
relied on the general partner’s assertions that the general
partner had authority to sign the consent form and (2) the
other partners knew that the IRS was relying on the actions
of the general partner as TMP. Cascade Partnership v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1996-299.
PENSION PLANS. For plans beginning in June 1996,
the weighted average is 6.92 percent with the permissible
range of 6.23 to 7.48 percent (90 to 109 percent permissable
range) and 6.23 to 7.61 percent (90 to 110  percent
permissable range) for purposes of determining the full
funding limitation under I.R.C. § 412(c)(7).  Notice 96-36,
I.R.B. 1996-__, _.
RETURNS. The IRS has adopted as final regulations
governing the requirements for furnishing a taxpayer
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identification number for resident and nonresident aliens
who cannot otherwise obtain a social security number. The
regulations provide for issuance by the IRS of an IRS
individual taxpayer identification number. The regulations
also provide that any resident or nonresident alien who files
an income, gift or estate tax return must provide a taxpayer
identification number. 61 Fed. Reg. 26788 (May 29, 1996).
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
July 1996
Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 6.04 5.95 5.91 5.88
110% AFR 6.66 6.55 6.50 6.46
120% AFR 7.27 7.14 7.08 7.04
Mid-term
AFR 6.74 6.63 6.58 6.54
110% AFR 7.42 7.29 7.22 7.18
120% AFR 8.12 7.96 7.88 7.83
Long-term
AFR 7.12 7.00 6.94 6.90
110% AFR 7.85 7.70 7.63 7.58
120% AFR 8.58 8.40 8.31 8.26
S CORPORATIONS
ELECTION. The U.S. Supreme Court has denied
certiorari in the following case. The taxpayer was a
shareholder of a corporation which claimed to have timely
filed a Form 2553 Subchapter S Election for 1986.
However, the IRS claimed to have not received the form.
The taxpayer presented extensive testimony by the form
preparer that the form was timely mailed, and the Tax Court
acknowledged that this testimony was believable. However,
the court held that a presumption of delivery was not
available to the taxpayer and that the requirements of I.R.C.
§ 7502 were the only  means of proving delivery of a
mailing. Section 7502 requires direct evidence of a
postmark on the document involved, which the court stated
could only be met, in cases of lost documents, by the record
of registered or certified mail. The taxpayer also presented
some evidence that the IRS had later mailed forms to the
taxpayer with information allegedly obtainable only from
the disputed Form 2553, thus proving IRS receipt of the
Form 2553. The court rejected the significance of this
evidence because the taxpayer failed to demonstrate that the
information was not supplied to the IRS by some other
means. As the Tax Court warns at the end of the opinion,
taxpayers assume the full risk of IRS's nonreceipt or loss of
filings unless the filings are mailed by registered or certified
mail. Carroll v. Comm'r, __ S.Ct. __ (1996), denying
cert., 96-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,010 (6th Cir. 1995),
aff'g, T.C. Memo. 1994-229.
TRUSTS. The taxpayer was the beneficiary of an
irrevocable trust funded with nonvoting S corporation stock.
The taxpayer had the right to withdraw contributions to the
trust within 60 days after the contribution. Upon the later of
the death of both grantors or the taxpayer’s reaching age 35,
the trust corpus was to be distributed to the taxpayer. The
IRS ruled that the taxpayer was deemed the owner of the
trust; therefore, the trust was a QSST. The IRS also ruled
that contributions to the trust were eligible for the gift tax
annual exclusion. The IRS also ruled that the trust would
not be included in the estate of either grantor. Ltr. Rul.
9625031, March 21, 1996.
SALE OF RESIDENCE. The taxpayers purchased a
new residence; however, because the real estate market was
depressed, the taxpayers were unable to sell their old home
within the time period required by I.R.C. § 1034. The
taxpayer sold their old residence to their wholly-owned
corporation within the time required. The ruling does not
mention the amount of any consideration paid by the
corporation. The IRS ruled that, because I.R.C. § 1034 had
no prohibition against sales to related parties, any gain from
the sale was to be deferred by the taxpayers. Ltr. Rul.
9625035, March 22, 1996.
NEGLIGENCE
CONTAMINATION OF GROUNDWATER. The
plaintiff was an experienced and successful cattle farmer
when the plaintiff purchased a farm in 1971. The plaintiff
purchased 100 young calves from Wisconsin which were
shipped by truck to the Colorado farm. Several of the calves
became ill or died and the plaintiff suspected that the
ground water well was contaminated by leaking chemicals
from a nearby Army arsenal. The evidence demonstrated
that several contaminants where in the water but none was
at a level considered toxic to humans or animals. In
addition, the plaintiff failed to provide any evidence that the
calves died from exposure to any of the known
contaminants. The court held that the plaintiff failed to
prove that the water was contaminated by the arsenal with
any substance which harmed the plaintiff’s calves. Land v.
U.S., 35 Fed. CL. 343 (1996).
PROPERTY
FIXTURES. The plaintiffs purchased real estate from a
bank. On the real estate was a grain storage facility which
the defendant had built on the property under a lease with
the previous owners. The defendant claimed ownership of
the facility, primarily grain bins, and the plaintiffs evicted
the defendant, arguing that the grain bins were fixtures sold
with the land. The lease had given the defendant the right to
build the facility and to remove the facility at the
termination of the lease. The court held that the grain bins
were not fixtures in that the original parties to the lease
contemplated their removal. The defendant argued that the
eviction was a breach of the lease to which the plaintiffs
were bound. The lease was unrecorded and the plaintiffs
showed that they had no knowledge of the lease before the
purchase. The court held that the plaintiffs were not bound
by the lease because they had no actual knowledge of the
lease and the property involved did not put the plaintiffs on
constructive notice that a lease existed. Garmon v.
Mitchell, 918 S.W.2d 201 (Ark. Ct. App. 1996).
CITATION UPDATES
Krapf v. U.S., 35 Fed. Cl. 286 (1996), on rem. from,
977 F.2d 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1992), rem'g, 17 Cl. Ct. 750
(1989) (valuation) see p. 89 supra.
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PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT. The parties owned
neighboring farms. When the plaintiffs purchased their
farm in 1969, the only road to their property was across the
defendants’ property and the plaintiffs used the road for 20
years until the defendants placed a locked gate ont he road.
The evidence showed that the road had been in existence
since the 1920s and used without question by the previous
owners of the plaintiffs’ property. The defendants acquired
their property in 1973 from their parents who acquired the
land in 1946. The court ruled that the over 70 years of use
of the road by the plaintiffs and their predecessors in
interest raised a presumption of adverse use of the road.
The defendants claimed that the use of the road was
permissive such that no adverse use occurred sufficient to
give rise to a prescriptive easement. The court held that the
trial court had sufficient evidence to determine that the use
of the road was not permissive. The court also held that the
prescriptive easement was not severed by the sale of the
property to the plaintiffs without mentioning the easement
in the deed, because the easement had already been
established prior to the sale and ran with the land. Phillips
v. Sommers, 917 S.W.2d 636 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
AGRICULTURAL LAW MANUAL
by Neil E. Harl
This comprehensive, annotated looseleaf manual is an
ideal deskbook for attorneys, tax consultants, lenders and
other professionals who advise agricultural clients. The
book contains over 900 pages and an index.
As a special offer to Digest subscribers, the Manual is
offered to new subscribers at $115, including at no extra
charge updates published within five months after
purchase. Updates are published every four months to keep
the Manual current with the latest developments. After the
first free update, additional updates will be billed at $100
per year or $35 each.
For your copy, send a check for $115 to Agricultural
Law Press, P.O. Box 50703, Eugene, OR 97405.
Satisfaction guaranteed. 30 day return privilege.
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